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The Quasi-Verbal Dispute Between Kripke and ‘Frege-Russell’ 
 
Abstract 
 
Traditional descriptivism and Kripkean causalism are standardly interpreted as 
rival theories on a single topic. I argue that there is no such shared topic, i.e. that 
there is no question that they can be interpreted as giving rival answers to. The 
only way to make sense of the commitment to epistemic transparency that 
characterizes traditional descriptivism is to interpret Russell and Frege as 
proposing rival accounts of how to characterize a subject’s beliefs about what 
names refer to.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Issues concerning verbal disputes have recently, after a long period of relative neglect, 
acquired renewed prominence in philosophy1. In this paper I will defend the claim that a 
specific dispute, namely the one between traditional descriptivism and Kripkean 
causalism, construed as theories of semantic reference, involves a type of verbal dispute. 
I will argue that the parties to the debate, whether they knew it or not, must have been 
thinking of different phenomena when using terms like ‘semantic referent’ and the like. 
This follows from the fact that there is simply no question that traditional descriptivism 
and Kripkean causalism can be seen as rival answers to. 
                                                 
1
 David Chalmers, for instance, has recently argued that many current disputes in philosophy may be verbal 
(Chalmers, 2011). 
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A descriptivist theory of the reference of proper names states that the referent of a name 
N is the individual that meets the descriptive condition that an utterer of the name 
associates with N as its semantic content. Such a view is commonly ascribed to Russell 
and Frege. This is typically contrasted to Kripke’s causal theory, which states that the 
referent of a name N is the individual that was baptised N at the beginning of the causal 
chain from which the utterer inherited N.  
 
Mark Sainsbury (2002)2 has claimed that the common view of the history of this debate is 
defective with regards to the work of Russell. The common view is that Russell is a 
semantic descriptivist in that he believed that the semantic referent of a common name is 
equivalent to, or abbreviates, a definite description in the mind of the speaker. Sainsbury 
claims that Russell did have a descriptivist theory, but that this descriptivist theory was 
not about semantic reference at all (2002: 87). Rather, Russell’s views were about “the 
thought in the mind of the speaker” (86) upon an occasion of use. Sainsbury claims that 
Russell’s interest was in capturing the thoughts and idiolectical meaning of the speaker 
(89) and not in the semantic referent of a term in a public language, as is the case with 
Kripke (89).  Furthermore, on those rare occasions that Russell does turn his attention to 
semantic reference, his views are nearly identical to Kripke. Russell, in fact, also views 
names as Millian, rigid designators (87).  
 
Sainsbury claims that Russell did not view the ‘semantic content’ of a name as 
determined by the thought in the mind of the speaker. Rather, Russell’s theory was 
                                                 
2
 First published in 1993. 
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simply about the thought in the mind of the speaker when uttering a name. In this paper I 
defend a related, but distinct view. Sainsbury claims that Russell explicitly took his 
descriptivist theory of reference to be a theory about the thoughts that accompany the use 
of a name.  I wish to claim that Russell’s thoughts were not about semantic reference, 
whether Russell knew this or not. Furthermore, while Sainsbury only defends Russell, I 
wish to claim that none of the traditional, descriptivist theories are about the same topic 
that Kripke’s theory is about, whether these authors (or Kripke) knew it or not. The 
arguments I will make are independent of the arguments made in Sainsbury’s article. 
Despite these differences I do, however, think that Sainsbury is right when he identifies 
thoughts and public language as the two fundamental, distinct topics that are at issue 
here.  
 
It may be useful to give a brief explanation of what I mean when I state that I am agnostic 
about whether these authors explicitly took their thoughts to be about a certain topic, but 
nonetheless claim that there is a sense in which their thoughts were clearly about that 
topic. Imagine two people, Andy and Boris, independently walking around a university. 
Both are quite impressed by the grounds, layout and architecture of where they are 
walking. Andy thinks that the university is well designed and impressive. Boris, however, 
mistakenly believes that he is walking around a technical college. Boris now thinks that 
the technical college is well designed and impressive. Now, even though Andy and Boris’ 
de dicto thoughts are different, it would be natural to, under the appropriate 
circumstances, report that both think the university is beautiful. Even though only Andy 
is explicitly aware of it, both of their thoughts are, in a sense, about the university. It is 
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quite tricky to explain what this quite natural way of talking amounts to and what makes 
it true. Maybe we should express what this sense of ‘about’ amounts to by saying that the 
university was the direct cause of the relevant beliefs and that ‘aboutness’ here just 
amounts to ‘being caused by’.  However, while causation may be a necessary feature of 
this sense of ‘aboutness’, it is far from sufficient. If I come to hold that pencils are green, 
purely due to a knock on the head or as a result of ingesting some mind-altering 
substances, we would not say that my belief is ‘really about’ the knock on my head or 
about the mind-altering substances. The causation that is involved in such cases did not 
come about in the appropriate way3. However, independently of whether we can think of 
this notion of ‘aboutness’ in terms of some constrained notion of causation or not, the fact 
remains that there is a clear sense in which both Andy and Boris had thoughts about the 
university, despite only Andy being aware of this. This means that we can differentiate 
between what someone thinks their thoughts are about and what the thoughts are actually 
about. Nothing in my argument depends on theoretical matters as to how this distinction 
should be understood. Hence I will rely on our intuitive grasp of this distinction when 
defending the claim that traditional descriptivism is ‘actually about’ one thing, while 
Kripkean causalism is ‘actually about’ something quite different.  
 
There is a substantial methodological difference between trying to ascertain what an 
author thinks he is writing about and trying to ascertain what an author is actually writing 
about. If one wishes to pursue the first kind of question, as Sainsbury does, then the 
appropriate method is one of detailed textual exegesis. This is not true of the kind of case 
                                                 
3One attractive option is to identify the object that the belief is about with the object that rationalizes the 
belief.  
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I will make. The appropriate method when trying to ascertain what an author is actually 
writing about involves some assumptions about the cognitive faculties of the author, the 
determination of the most fundamental features of the author’s view, and an attempt to 
find the objects in reality that have, or could plausibly be thought to have, these features. 
I will follow this method below and show that it gives a clear, definitive result.  
 
2. The speaker’s referent, conventional referent and supposed conventional referent  
 
Consider the following three truisms that are rarely, if ever, denied. Firstly, there are 
public conventions that determine the meanings of words in general and also determine 
the referents of proper names. In this way it is a convention that ‘Quine’ refers to Quine 
and not to Ponting, just as it is a convention that ‘ashes’ denotes ashes and not shavings. 
This leads to the definition of the ‘conventional referent’. 
 
Conventional referent: The conventional referent of a name N is the individual 
that is determined in virtue of the communal convention governing the use of N. 
 
The second truism is that language is public, i.e. communal, which implies that it has to 
be taught to individual speakers. The conventions governing the use of terms are 
empirical facts, in some sense, and individual speakers can learn these empirical facts 
correctly or incorrectly. In this way I can wrongly think that ‘Quine’ refers to Ponting, 
just as I can wrongly think that ‘ashes’ denotes shavings. This implies that individual 
speakers must have linguistic beliefs about the public meanings of terms and that these 
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beliefs must include beliefs about the conventional referents of proper names. This leads 
to the definition of the ‘supposed conventional referent’. 
 
Supposed conventional referent: The supposed conventional referent of a name N 
for a speaker S is the individual that S believes to be the conventional referent of 
N. 
The third truism is that proper names are used by speakers when they intend to refer to 
individuals. This leads to the definition of the ‘speaker’s referent’. 
 
Speaker’s referent: The speaker’s referent of a name N on an occasion of use and 
for a speaker S is the individual that S intends to refer to upon an occasion of use 
of N. 
 
Note that while the individuals identified in these three ways upon an occasion of the use 
of a name will tend to be identical, they can diverge. Suppose say that Caroline and Drew 
are walking down the road when Caroline sees an individual, namely Siddle, behaving 
oddly. She wishes to warn Drew to stay away from the person behaving oddly. Looking 
closely, she gets a glimpse of the facial features of Siddle. Her senses are deceived, 
however, in that the gestalt of the facial features that her brief glimpse leaves her with is 
not that of Siddle, but of Quine. Matters are further complicated by the fact that, when 
she learned the name of the person with these facial features, i.e. the facial features that 
she thinks the person in front of her has, she learned it incorrectly. Instead of learning that 
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the person with such features is called ‘Quine’, she learned that he is called ‘Ponting’. 
Turning to Drew she now says: “Watch out, Ponting has gone crazy!” 
 
In the above case the speaker’s referent, the supposed conventional referent and the 
actual conventional referent are three distinct individuals. The speaker’s referent of 
‘Ponting’, i.e. the person Caroline was trying to refer to in virtue of the conversational 
context, is the man behaving oddly, namely Siddle. The conventional referent of 
‘Ponting’, i.e. the referent determined by the convention governing ‘Ponting’, is Ponting. 
The supposed conventional referent, i.e. the person that Caroline thinks that ‘Ponting’ 
refers to, is Quine.  
 
The tripartite distinction constructed above gives rise to three distinguishable referential 
intentions. Caroline’s main referential intention, in virtue of the conversational context, 
was to refer to Siddle, who is the speaker’s referent of her utterance. The category of the 
supposed conventional referent gives rise to a secondary referential intention to refer to 
Quine. This referential intention is conceptually distinct from her primary referential 
intention to refer to Siddle. The category of the actual conventional referent gives rise to 
a third referential intention, due to the fact that Caroline presumably has a standing 
intention when using a name to refer to the conventional referent of the name4.  
 
                                                 
4
 This point is based on two remarks made by Kripke (1977: 264, 273n). (The tripartite distinction 
developed above is my attempt at a more fine-grained distinction than the one between ‘speaker’s 
reference’ and ‘semantic reference’ in Kripke’s paper.) 
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The above example relies on a commonsense distinction between what people mean, 
what words mean and what individuals think words mean, as applied to names. With the 
distinction drawn, I can now state the exact claim that I wish to make. This is that 
traditional descriptivism is about the determination of the supposed conventional referent, 
i.e. about the relation between Caroline’s utterance of ‘Ponting’ and Quine. Kripke’s 
causal theory is about the determination of the actual conventional referent, i.e. about the 
relation between Caroline’s utterance of ‘Ponting’ and Ponting.  
 
In other words, the phenomenon in reality that led to the views of the traditional 
descriptivists is the fact that people have certain beliefs about what public language 
names refer to. The phenomenon that led to Kripke’s views is the fact that words in 
public languages do have communally determined referents. The evidence that I will give 
for these claims is that the fundamental theoretical commitments and results of the 
descriptivist and Kripkean theories have exactly the properties that these phenomena 
have, or that they could plausibly be thought to have.  
 
I will present three arguments. The first focuses on the theoretical results of the causal 
theory and descriptivism, the second looks at the descriptivist commitment to epistemic 
transparency and the third concerns the matter of ‘idiolects’. 
 
3. The argument from theoretical results (Dictionary argument) 
 
 9 
Let us imagine that someone wanted to compile a dictionary of all the public names of 
persons that a given speaker - call her Emma - knows5. For every given name known to 
Emma our lexicographer includes a photo of the conventional referent of the name next 
to the name. Assume that the lexicographer uses the same general method to determine 
which name goes with which picture as lexicographers generally use when compiling 
traditional dictionaries. Call the completed result the Conventional dictionary. 
 
Now imagine that the same lexicographer is also interested in the linguistic beliefs that 
Emma, at a specific point in time, has about specific names. Our lexicographer 
determines all the names that Emma uses, lists them, and, next to each, puts a picture of 
the individual that Emma believes the name to refer to. Assume that Emma has quite a 
few mistaken beliefs about the names that she uses. Call the completed result the Emma 
dictionary. 
 
Now create two further documents by applying the traditional, descriptivist theory of 
names and the Kripkean, causalist theory of names to the names Emma can potentially 
use in utterances. In the case of Kripkean causalism, determine the individuals baptized at 
the beginning of the causal chain that led to Emma being in possession of the names she 
uses. Draw up a list of these names with a picture of the individual identified by the 
causal theory next to it. Call the result the Kripkean dictionary. Imagine that a semantic 
                                                 
5
 I am restricting this to persons, as countries are hard to take definitive pictures of and mathematical 
objects are even harder to take pictures of. Of course, nothing stops us from compiling non-pictorial 
dictionaries of such objects. In the case of mathematical objects, we already do this when we list the values 
of objects like Avogadro’s constant, the Planck length, etc. 
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descriptivist performed the equivalent task for descriptivism. In other words, the 
descriptivist somehow identifies the descriptive conditions that, in terms of descriptivist 
semantics, Emma supposedly identifies with a given name, determines the person, if any, 
that these conditions apply to, and includes photos of the relevant person next to each 
name. Call this the Russellian dictionary. 
 
The argument can now be stated very simply. The Russellian dictionary and the Kripkean 
dictionary will give differing results for a certain set of the names that Emma uses. Where 
these results differ the Russellian dictionary will give the results in the Emma dictionary, 
while the Kripkean dictionary will give the results in the Conventional dictionary. This is 
because the Conventional dictionary and the Emma dictionary will differ in cases where 
Emma uses a name incorrectly and precisely these facts about incorrect usage will 
(almost) always cause a similar divergence between the Kripkean and Russellian 
dictionaries. Simply put, where the person who compiles the Emma dictionary would 
explain divergence from the Conventional dictionary by saying that Emma has a false 
linguistic belief concerning a name, the person who compiles the Russellian dictionary 
would explain divergence from the Kripkean dictionary by saying that Emma attaches an 
idiosyncratic descriptive condition to a name. I think that the latter explanation is just a 
confused way of saying what is perfectly expressed in the former explanation. I will run 
through an example to illustrate such divergence: 
 
Imagine the case of Emma who listens to a conversation between economics professors 
and acquires the names ‘Paul Krugman’ and ‘Robert Lucas’. However, Emma did not 
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understand the conversation well and managed to get the two mixed up. Emma acquires 
the belief that ‘Lucas’ refers to a person who won the 2008 Nobel Memorial prize in 
economics, authored Peddling Prosperity and is the most famous current defender of 
Keynes. In such a case the Conventional dictionary will still list Lucas as the referent of 
‘Lucas’, but the Emma dictionary will list Krugman as the referent of ‘Lucas’. This is 
quite straightforward and is just another way of saying that Emma incorrectly believes 
that ‘Lucas’ refers to Krugman. 
 
The above difference will also be reflected in the Kripkean and Russellian dictionary. 
The Kripkean lexicographer will attempt to trace the use of ‘Lucas’ back to an original 
baptism. If we assume that the case of ‘Lucas’ is not deviant in some way, i.e. is not an 
Evans-style case, such a method would presumably identify Lucas as the referent of 
‘Lucas’. In a similar way, and even though there may be space for some disagreement as 
to exactly what should count as the relevant descriptive condition(s), the Russellian 
lexicographer will treat Emma’s false linguistic beliefs as providing the descriptive 
condition she associates with ‘Lucas’. The person that these conditions apply to is 
Krugman and for this reason the Russellian dictionary will list Krugman as the referent of 
‘Lucas’. In this way the Kripkean dictionary will (mostly) track the conventional 
dictionary, while the Russellian dictionary will track the Emma dictionary.  
 
The individuals identified by the descriptivist theory of reference will correspond to the 
content of a dictionary drawn up to reflect Emma’s linguistic beliefs. In the same way, 
the results of the causal theory will (mostly) reflect the results of a dictionary drawn up to 
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reflect the actual conventional referents of the names that Emma uses. For this reason, I 
submit that traditional descriptivism is actually about (in my sense of ‘about’) our beliefs 
about the conventional reference of names, while Kripkean causalism is actually about 
the conventional reference of names. Call this the dictionary argument. 
 
Four things should be noted about the above argument. Firstly, Kripke’s theory will not 
give the exact results given in the Conventional dictionary. This is due to the ‘reference-
shift’ cases originally pointed out by Evans (1982: 301). There have historically, most 
famously with the case of ‘Madagascar’, been cases where the referent of a name has 
shifted from the one it was given when the name was introduced. Note, however, that all 
causalists, including Kripke (1980: 163), have responded to such cases by accepting that 
the causal theory is incomplete and that the data that there are such reference-shifts 
should be accepted. Their inquiries treat the explanation of the data in the Conventional 
dictionary as the normative ideal that they are supposed to strive towards when 
constructing theories. Hence the fact that Kripkean causalism won’t quite generate the 
Conventional dictionary is no objection to the claim that Kripkean causalism is an 
attempt to explain the content of the Conventional dictionary.  
 
Secondly, note that something similar holds with regard to the relation between 
descriptivism and the Emma dictionary. I find it plausible that, if a specific theory, say 
that of Russell, failed to match the Emma dictionary in certain ways, the descriptivist 
would view this as a problem for Russell’s views. Any difficulty in identifying the 
individual that a person thinks a name refers to must also crop up as a problem for a 
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descriptivist trying to determine the individual picked out in accordance with the 
descriptive condition governing a speaker’s use of a name. 
 
Thirdly, I wish to pre-empt any attacks based on the fact that Kripke’s theory and 
traditional descriptivism are theories about the reference of names upon an occasion of 
use. This does not matter. We can imagine an extended version of the Conventional 
dictionary that captures the actual conventional referents of names as used by Emma over 
a period of time and an extended Emma dictionary that captures the supposed referents of 
names for the same speaker over the same period of time. The exact same reasoning 
would still apply. 
 
Fourthly, the reader may well have noted that I have mostly avoided the terms ‘semantic’, 
‘semantic referent’ or ‘semantic content’. I have avoided the term ‘semantic’ precisely 
because I believe it to be a term of art that may have outlived its usefulness and serves to 
trick philosophers into thinking that a genuine question exists where no such question 
remains. I do not believe that there is a non-trivial question that traditional6 descriptivism 
and Kripkean causalism can be seen as rival answers to. We can reasonably inquire into 
how the conventional referent, the supposed referent and the speaker’s referent are 
determined. These would be three conceptually distinct inquiries. There are also other 
concepts relevant to language that we can reasonably ask questions about. But there is 
                                                 
6
 By ‘traditional’ descriptivism I mean the internalist theories of Russell, Frege and Kripke’s (notorious) 
‘Frege-Russell’. I do not mean to imply that there is no possible dispute between, for instance, externalist 
versions of descriptivism and Kripkean causalism. 
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simply no legitimate question that is ‘semantic’ in the sense needed for Kripke and 
Russell to have a legitimate dispute. If the term ‘semantic referent’ is thought to mean 
something distinct from the three concepts developed here (or obvious extensions of 
them), it is simply a will o’ the wisp. Later on I will have a lot more to say in defense of 
this claim.  For now, I will proceed by looking at the theoretical commitments of 
causalism and descriptivism, in order to show that they match those we would expect 
from a theory of conventional reference and supposed conventional reference 
respectively. 
 
4. The argument from eccentricity and epistemic transparency 
 
4.1 Descriptivism, eccentricity and epistemic transparency 
 
In Russellian semantics (on the traditional interpretation) the meaning of the expressions 
used by a speaker is claimed to be perfectly reducible to objects (sense-data and 
universals) that we are acquainted with (1910: 108-110). Acquaintance is understood as a 
‘direct cognitive relation’ that rules out the very possibility of a mistake. Thus semantics 
should fundamentally be understood in terms of entities that the subject has perfect and 
privileged access to. Fregean semantics is similar in this regard. What we would 
commonly describe as a situation where I use a word wrongly simply amounts to an 
idiosyncratic ‘idiolect’ in Fregean semantics (1948: 210). Both Russell and Frege are 
committed to the view that a subject S cannot be mistaken about the content of some 
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content-carrying entity employed by S, and that such content determines the real-world 
referent of the content-carrying entity (if any). Call this view epistemic transparency. 
 
The matter of epistemic transparency is conceptually related to the matter of eccentricity, 
here defined as the view that the meaning of a name depends solely on facts about the 
mental state of the user of the name. In the case of both Russell and Frege it is the case 
that, if all the mental facts about an individual are given, then, however these mental facts 
are to be understood, the meaning of any uttered name is thereby fixed. One cannot 
plausibly be committed to epistemic transparency without also being committed to 
eccentricity, as the only plausible way to defend epistemic transparency about names 
would be to hold that the mental states of people are directly accessible to them. This 
presupposes that the meanings of names are eccentric, i.e. solely a matter of the mental 
states of individuals. I distinguish these issues, however, as, while epistemic transparency 
presupposes eccentricity, the reverse does not hold. One could claim that ‘the meanings 
of names’ are eccentric, but deny that we have direct access to the full content of our 
mental states. As epistemic transparency is the stronger commitment, I will state my 
argument in terms of it, and merely note how the considerations involved serve to explain 
the traditional descriptivists’ commitment to eccentricity. 
 
The issue of epistemic transparency raises a puzzle. The public, conventional nature of 
proper names makes mistakes inevitable and their source easily understood. Yet both 
Russell and Frege think that a commitment to epistemic transparency is both necessary 
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and fundamental7. The question now arises: is this seeming difference between our 
commonsense understanding of linguistic conventions and the theories of Russell and 
Frege a difference on a matter of substance, or is the difference merely verbal? I think 
that it is absurd to view this difference as anything but verbal. This is not a terribly 
interesting thesis in itself, but I also think that this verbal dispute underlies much of 20th 
century semantics. I will start my argument by explaining exactly what the commitment 
to epistemic transparency that characterizes traditional descriptivism amounts to, before 
arguing that the difference in doctrine between traditional descriptivism and causalism 
concerning epistemic transparency is purely verbal. 
 
4.2 Epistemic transparency does not imply referential infallibility 
 
Note that the descriptivist commitment to epistemic transparency, expressed in terms of 
the theory of reference, does not mean that descriptivists claim that there is no sense in 
which a speaker can be wrong about the referent of a name. A speaker can still apply a 
name incorrectly. Imagine that Flintoff correctly believes that ‘Quine’ refers to the 
philosopher with the driest wit. If Flintoff sees Nadal standing in front of him and thinks 
that the person in front of him is the philosopher with the driest wit, and tries to refer to 
the person standing in front of him using ‘Quine’, the semantic descriptivist would claim 
that Flintoff has referred to Quine. Flintoff’s belief that he, in virtue of using ‘Quine’, has 
                                                 
7
 I take it that this claim is uncontroversial. Boghossian (1994), for instance, also interprets Russell and 
Frege in a relevantly similar way. Kripke himself has recently (2008) argued that Frege is not only 
committed to epistemic transparency, but also to something akin to Russellian acquaintance. 
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referred to the man standing in front of him, is incorrect. This is because descriptivism, 
traditionally understood, does not claim that a speaker always succeeds in referring to 
what he wants to refer to, i.e. it does not claim that the speaker’s referent and the 
semantic referent always coincide. Rather, it claims that a speaker cannot be wrong about 
the conditions determining what a given name refers to. According to descriptivism, as 
traditionally understood, Flintoff cannot believe that what is commonly referred to as the 
‘standing meaning’ of a name like ‘Quine’ is ‘the philosopher with the driest wit’ and 
then have it turn out that this condition does not govern the reference of ‘Quine’. This is 
where it appears to differ from our ordinary understanding of language. The commitment 
to epistemic transparency that characterises traditional descriptivism does allow for the 
misapplication of names due to some erroneous belief concerning a matter of substance 
(like: ‘the man standing in front of me is the philosopher with the driest wit’), but does 
not allow for purely linguistic mistakes.  Herein lies the sharp contrast between traditional 
descriptivism, as standardly interpreted, on the one hand, and our commonsense 
understanding of language - and Kripkean causalism - on the other hand. Both kinds of 
mistakes are allowed in our commonsense understanding of language and in Kripkean 
causalism. It is this contrast that I will claim to be purely verbal, as traditional 
descriptivism is not about the conventional reference of names, as Kripke’s theory is, but 
about something else entirely. 
 
4.3 Traditional descriptivism is about supposed reference, not conventional reference 
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Kripke explicitly states that his theory is about the reference of names in a public 
language (1977: 263, 273n), i.e. about what I have termed the conventional reference of 
names8, and is standardly interpreted as such. This accounts for his externalism. It is a 
mere truism, referred to earlier, that the conventional referent of a name is not fixed 
uniquely by each individual user of a name. Rather names are governed by communal 
conventions and the content of these conventions can be learned correctly or incorrectly. 
Hence the epistemic opacity of Kripke’s theory is accounted for, as Kripkean causalism is 
a theory which claims that the conventional reference of public language names is fixed 
by historical chains of use.  
 
However - and this is vital - these exact considerations make it absurd to claim that 
traditional descriptivism is about the same topic that Kripke’s theory is about. The 
convention governing a name (whether upon an occasion of use or otherwise) is public, 
empirically discoverable and shared. It is the kind of thing we can be wrong about. We 
cannot seriously suppose that there is any sense in which traditional descriptivism denies 
these truisms. But, if we wish to portray traditional descriptivism as a rival to Kripke, we 
                                                 
8
 Some have also interpreted Kripke as denying the possibility of a descriptivist theory of speaker’s 
reference. Be that as it may, in this paper I will only focus on the main dispute in Naming and Necessity, 
namely the one concerning semantic reference. (Note that Kripke says explicitly (p. 25, footnote 3, 
reaffirmed in footnote 36, p.86) that his book is about semantic reference. In footnote 36 he also seems to 
explicitly deny that Naming and Necessity concerns speaker’s reference.)  I am not, of course, claiming that 
one could not extend Kripke’s arguments in this way, or claiming that such a dispute would also be verbal. 
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have to portray traditional descriptivism as claiming that the conventional, publicly 
assigned referents of names are determined in terms of conditions that are individually 
idiosyncratic, epistemically transparent and infallibly tied to names. But this is to ascribe 
an absurd view to Russell and Frege and to suppose that they, inexplicably, missed the 
fact that the public usage of names is taught, and hence can be learned incorrectly, by 
individual speakers. And yet, on the traditional construal, we are forced to say that 
descriptivism, while it can account for the misapplication of names, as explained above, 
denies the very possibility of linguistic mistakes.  
 
If a friend tells us that cars are green, leafy vegetables that are mostly available during the 
summer we will not credit him with a stupid theory of motor vehicles. Rather we will try 
and determine what he is really thinking about. In a similar way, we should not interpret 
the descriptivist claim that the condition governing the use of a name is infallibly known 
to the speaker as being a particularly stupid theory of those linguistic facts that we are 
typically taught when we first meet a stranger, e.g. that ‘Quine’ refers to Quine, etc. 
Rather, we should respond to such claims by trying to determine what Russell and Frege 
were really thinking about. What, then, could this be? 
 
Some of our puzzlement vanishes if we view descriptivists as giving an account of the 
determination of the speaker’s referent. The determination of the speaker’s referent is 
exactly the kind of thing that many philosophers view as individually idiosyncratic, 
private, epistemically transparent and internalist. This was especially true at the time 
Russell and Frege were writing and fits with their views on related topics.  
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This, however, will not do. The conditions determining the speaker’s referent when using 
a name may well be private, epistemically transparent and individually idiosyncratic. But 
it is too idiosyncratic. Such conditions differ for different speakers, which is consistent 
with what traditional descriptivists say about names, but they also differ wildly for one 
speaker from one occasion to the next, which is not. Of course, the traditional 
descriptivists, i.e. Russell, Frege and the developers of variants of their theories, are not 
quite in agreement on this issue. Both Russell and Frege are frequently portrayed as being 
committed to such stability in quick summaries of their work, but this does considerable 
violence to Russell’s view (Russell, 1910: 115). Russell’s actual view does not affect our 
argument though, and for this reason I will continue to speak of ‘traditional 
descriptivism’, so construed, for now. I will only discuss his actual view later on in this 
paper.  
 
The view of the traditional descriptivists (or, at least, the view commonly ascribed to 
them) is that there is a standing meaning that is associated with a name. This standing 
meaning will tend to stay relatively constant and only change upon occasion, presumably 
when very important information concerning the referent of a name comes to light. Hence 
the content of traditional descriptivist theories of names makes it highly implausible that 
descriptivist theories of references are, in my sense of ‘about’, about the speaker’s 
reference9. 
                                                 
9There is another reason why traditional descriptivism about reference cannot actually be about the 
speaker’s reference. The referent identified by descriptivist theories need not be the speaker’s referent, as 
was shown above in the case of Flintoff’s use of ‘Quine’. 
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We need to find some entity that can plausibly be construed as internalist and 
epistemically transparent, but that is also relatively stable across occasions of use. The 
beliefs that a given speaker has concerning the conventional referent, i.e. the 
determinants of the supposed referent of a name in the speaker’s vocabulary, fit the bill 
perfectly. I will demonstrate by using an example that illustrates my tripartite distinction, 
but that does not depend on perceptual beliefs as the Quine/Ponting/Siddle example did.  
 
Consider a conversation where someone (Hans) says that, no matter how much money 
you have, you will always be unsatisfied as someone else will have more. It is, of course, 
not true that, for any given person, there is someone who is richer. Gerald wishes to 
communicate this by pointing out that the world’s richest man would disagree with what 
Hans said. Gerald mistakenly believes that the chairman of Berkshire Hathaway is the 
richest man in the world. Furthermore, suppose that Gerald believes that the chairman of 
Berkshire Hathaway is called ‘Gates’. The convention that ‘Gates’ refers to Bill Gates is 
a public convention that can be taught, and learned, incorrectly, and Gerald was unlucky 
enough to somehow get this wrong. Gerald now says: “I think Gates would disagree”. 
 
In order to fully understand the above situation we need to know that Gerald was trying 
to say something about the world’s richest man - currently the telecommunications 
entrepreneur Carlos Slim - and hence the speaker’s referent of his utterance was Slim. 
We also need to know that ‘Gates’ actually refers to Gates, i.e. that Gates is the referent 
conventionally assigned to ‘Gates’. We also need to know that Gerald has a false belief 
concerning the convention governing ‘Gates’ (as well as the false substantive belief that 
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the world’s richest man is the chairman of Berkshire Hathaway) and that the person that 
he believes the name ‘Gates’ refers to is Buffett.  
 
The notion of the speaker’s referent captures the relation between Gerald’s utterance of 
‘Gates’ and Slim, while the notion of the conventional referent captures the relation 
between ‘Gates’ and Gates. In a similar way the notion of the supposed conventional 
referent captures the relation between Gerald’s utterance of ‘Gates’ and Buffett. On the 
view defended, here Kripke’s semantic theory is a theory of how it is that ‘Gates’ refers 
to Gates. Russell’s theory is about the relation between ‘Gates’ and Buffett. That 
Russell’s theory relates ‘Gates’ to Buffett is not a mistake, as was claimed, for relevantly 
similar cases, in Naming and Necessity. Rather, it is the correct result as Russell’s theory 
concerns the supposed referent, and not the actual referent. 
 
The notion of the supposed referent fits traditional descriptivism exactly. The 
determinants of the supposed conventional referents will differ across people as different 
people will have different, but mostly consistent, beliefs concerning the conventional 
referent of a name. This is due to the fact that different people will characterize their 
knowledge of the conventional referent of a name using different information. In this 
way, people who know someone from seeing them on a daily basis will probably use a 
visual stereotype to characterize their belief as to the referent of a name, people who have 
not seen a person will use other information concerning the person that they do have 
available, and famous people from long ago will typically have contemporary users 
characterize their beliefs concerning the referents of these people’s names in terms of 
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their ‘famous deeds’. This is exactly the kind of thing that descriptivists claim for their 
species of meaning. 
 
These determinants of the supposed referent will also be relatively stable across time, 
though not immutable. Over time our erroneous conventional beliefs can be corrected, we 
learn new and better criteria that identify certain individuals, and so on. This, once again, 
fits perfectly with what traditional, semantic descriptivism says about the conditions 
governing names. Furthermore, the determination of the supposed referent will be 
eccentric, i.e. will depend on the mental state of the utterer, just as the referent 
determined in terms of traditional descriptivism is supposed to depend on the mental state 
of the utterer. 
 
Also note that, on the above view, we can make perfect sense of the descriptivist 
commitment to epistemic transparency. Our knowledge of the determinants of the 
supposed referent is exactly the kind of thing that descriptivists would construe as 
epistemically transparent. Simply put, I may be wrong about who ‘Quine’ actually refers 
to, but it can plausibly be maintained that I cannot be wrong about the criteria 
determining the individual that I think ‘Quine’ refers to. Hence the descriptivist 
commitment to epistemic transparency should be interpreted as being a claim about our 
meta-linguistic beliefs, i.e. our beliefs about what we believe names refer to.  
 
On the standard interpretation of the debate we have to ascribe to descriptivists the dotty 
views that a speaker cannot be wrong about the conditions that actually govern the use of 
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a name, as well as the view that the conditions that govern the use of a name depend 
solely on facts about the individual user of a name. Such views are dotty as they amount 
to a denial that there is such a thing as a learned, public language. On the view I defend 
here, the true content of their position is much more plausible. The commitment to 
epistemic transparency only amounts to the claim that we have perfect access to our 
meta-linguistic beliefs. Such a view is not beyond argument - and is something anti-
individualists regarding mental content would deny - but at least such a view is not 
obviously absurd and, furthermore, it sounds like exactly the kind of thing that Russell 
and Frege would affirm. Similarly, the commitment to eccentricity only amounts to the 
view that the content of a speaker’s meta-linguistic beliefs depend on the mental state of 
the speaker. This is the merest truism, and may well be why neither Russell nor Frege 
spent any time arguing for this claim. Therefore I think that supposed reference is what 
Russell and Frege were actually talking ‘about’, even though they may not have 
understood their own doctrines in this way. An application of even the most conservative 
principle of charity forces us to conclude that their theories are not about what words 
mean, but about what people think words mean.  
 
Note that, on this interpretation, the causal and descriptivist theories are consistent. It  can 
reasonably be claimed that the conventional referent of a name is determined in virtue of 
a baptismal convention coupled with a causal chain of use and also that the linguistic 
beliefs of a speaker amount to a set of descriptive conditions that the individual believes 
are fulfilled by the individual who is the conventional referent of a name. Such a view is 
plainly not beyond argument, but at least it is coherent and not obviously wrong. 
 25 
 
4.4 How Russell’s actual view fits into this picture 
 
In “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” (1910:115), Russell 
notes that different people can abbreviate the same name by using different descriptive 
conditions. He says that, for a single utterer trying to talk about a single individual, these 
descriptions will vary over time (114) and that it is a matter of chance “which 
characteristics of a man’s appearance will come into a friend’s mind when he thinks of 
him” (114). Speaking of ‘Bismarck’, he says that “the description in our minds will 
probably be some more or less vague mass of historical knowledge – far more, in most 
cases, than is required to identify him” (115). Later on Russell implies that all the 
information I have at my disposal does not apply on a given occasion of use. When 
writing of ‘Julius Caesar’ he says that, on a given occasion of use, “in order to discover 
what is actually on my mind when I judge about Julius Caesar, we must substitute for the 
proper name a description made up of some of the things I know about him” (119, my 
italics). 
 
What are we to make of this? In terms of my analysis, these Russellian views can easily 
be interpreted as being ‘about’ our linguistic beliefs. Such an interpretation would ascribe 
to Russell the view that there is never, or rarely, one consistently used descriptive 
condition that determines who I think a name refers to. Rather, what happens is that I 
wish to refer to someone, and, based on a piece of information already in my possession 
or subsequently acquired, I identify a name in my possession that I believe refers to this 
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person. Such information then plays the role of ‘linguistically relevant information’ in a 
specific context. 
 
Taking an example, suppose I spot someone across the street who is walking oddly. 
Looking closely I see the facial features of the person, realize that it is Harry who is 
walking oddly, and say “Harry is limping”. In such a case the intended or speaker’s 
referent is whoever is walking oddly. Note that I saw that the person walking oddly has 
certain facial features, and that this is what guided my use of the name ‘Harry’. Hence it 
must be the case that I had the pre-existing, substantive belief that Harry has these facial 
features. This substantive belief guided my linguistic behaviour and hence the belief that 
whoever has those facial features is called ‘Harry’ can be ascribed to me. This is where 
the issue of epistemic transparency comes in, as I cannot be wrong in my meta-linguistic 
belief that I believe the person with such facial features to be called ‘Harry’. Hence, in 
my idiolect at this given point in time, ‘Harry’ is incontrovertibly tied to the condition 
‘person with such and such facial features’.  
 
This only makes Harry’s facial features the idiolectical meaning of Harry in this case 
though. Next time I may wish to refer to ‘the person I am hearing in the distance’, 
recognize Harry’s voice, and use my knowledge of what his voice sounds like to serve as 
the ‘idiolectical’ meaning. In other words my meta-linguistic belief concerning this use of 
‘Harry’ is best expressed as saying that I believe ‘Harry’ to refer to ‘the person with such 
and such a voice’. In this way, any number of my substantive beliefs concerning Harry 
can play the role determining my linguistic beliefs on a specific occasion of use. The 
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condition determining the intended referent can also consist of a piece of information 
already known to me and hence it can, itself, serve as the linguistic content. In other 
words, I can intend to refer to my best friend and already know that Hogan is my best 
friend, and hence the content of ‘Hogan’ can be given by ‘my best friend’. But in such a 
case the intended referent and the supposed referent are still conceptually distinct. These 
two aspects are always distinct in principle and often distinct in practice.  
 
Hence the specifics of Russell’s view, i.e. the detail beyond his commitment to epistemic 
transparency and eccentricity, make perfect sense when interpreted as being about our 
linguistic beliefs. In fact, it seems likely that the dispute between descriptivist theories 
that postulate a standing meaning and Russellian views should be understood as a dispute 
about how we should characterize a person’s beliefs concerning linguistic conventions.  
 
5. The argument from idiolects 
 
The last argument I wish to make is quite short and concerns the matter of ‘idiolects’. 
Traditional descriptivists are sometimes said to characterize language as a set of distinct, 
but overlapping ‘idiolects’. What would constitute the idiolect of an individual speaker? 
Given that it is uncontroversial that linguistic conventions exist, and given that a speaker 
must have a set of beliefs concerning these conventions, I see no candidate for the 
idiolect of an individual other than identifying this idiolect with the set of beliefs that a 
speaker has regarding these public, linguistic conventions. In talking of idiolects we are 
trying to capture a speaker’s ‘linguistic grasp’ of a situation. The most obvious way to 
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characterize a speaker’s  ‘linguistic grasp’ is to equate such a grasp with the set of beliefs 
that the speaker has concerning conventional, public rules. Hence, if traditional 
descriptivists were trying to characterize idiolects, and if idiolects are given by a subject’s 
linguistic beliefs, then Frege10 and Russell were actually talking about (in my sense of 
‘about’), our linguistic beliefs. Note that the attempt to characterize our linguistic beliefs 
is useful work, as such characterisation of individual ‘idiolects’ (beliefs about linguistic 
conventions) is a vital part of the theory of communication. This is due to such linguistic 
beliefs being the explanatory link between the use of public language and the thoughts of 
individual speakers. 
 
It has now been argued that every single interesting property of traditional descriptivism 
is true of, or would have been maintained by Russell and Frege to be true of, our 
linguistic beliefs about names. The same is true of Kripke and the conventional referent. 
Given these facts, I do not really see how the evidence in favour of believing that their 
theories are about distinct topics can really be stronger.  
 
I see only one way of escaping the conclusion that, in my sense of ‘about’, Kripke and 
traditional descriptivists were not talking about the same topic. This would be to admit 
that traditional descriptivism cannot be about conventional reference, but then to also 
deny that Kripke’s theory is about conventional reference and to claim that ‘semantics’ is 
                                                 
10
 Frege’s claim that senses are public does not contradict his view that people tend to have idiosyncratic 
idiolects. The first claim amounts to saying that grasping a thought is a matter of being in touch with a 
public, abstract, objectively existing entity. The latter claim is the denial that people typically grasp the 
same public thought when uttering the same sentence containing a 
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really about some other topic entirely. Such a dialectical move is misguided, as will be 
shown below. 
 
6. What is ‘semantics’ supposed to be about? 
 
6.1 An objection 
 
A seemingly plausible objection can go as follows. Let us define the ‘semantic referent’ 
of a name as the individual that best explains our attribution of truth-conditions to an 
utterance in which the name occurs. This leads to a well-defined research program: 
determine what truth-conditions competent speakers attribute to utterances, and then 
construct a theory that explains such attributions. Using this definition, it is perfectly 
possible that we can discover that interpreters assign truth-conditions in one of at least 
three different ways. 
 
We can discover - the objection continues - that interpreters assign truth-conditions to 
utterances in which names occur based on the causal chain of use relevant to the name, or 
based on the descriptive condition the utterer associates with the name, or, for that matter, 
based on what the utterer was trying to refer to when using the name. If we discovered 
such a thing it could show that, while people do use public conventions in order to 
communicate, these conventions do not determine the semantic referent, as defined 
above. Call a language where interpreters assign truth-conditions based on the descriptive 
condition the utterer attaches to the name Russellian English, call a language where 
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interpreters assign truth-conditions based on the causal chain from which the utterer 
inherited the name Kripkean English, and call a language where truth-conditions are 
assigned in terms of what the speaker - based on the conversational context – is trying to 
refer to Donnellian English. On this definition of ‘semantic reference’ it is clear that 
Russellian English, Kripkean English and Donnellian English are rival answers to an 
empirical question. We can give subjects cases like Ponting/Quine/Siddle or 
Slim/Gates/Buffett and try to determine whether English is Kripkean, Russellian or 
Donnellian.  
 
6.2 Objection answered:  the objector’s definition of ‘semantic’ cannot be used to ask a 
determinate question 
 
I think the above objection captures how a majority of philosophers think of ‘semantic 
content’. It is assumed that interpreters assign truth-conditions to utterances and that we 
should try to develop theories that describe and explain these judgments. The problem 
with such a view lies in the very first stipulation made by the objector, namely ‘[l]et us 
define the ‘semantic referent’ of a term as the individual that best explains our attribution 
of truth-conditions to an utterance’. This does not amount to a well-formed definition 
with a determinate content of the required type. An interpreter can take us to be asking 
about the truth-conditions determined by what the speaker means, what the speaker 
believes the words mean, what the words actually mean, or some other related type of 
‘meaning’. But we already know the answer to the first three questions, and the definition 
itself fails to identify a fourth question. We already know what the conventional, 
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supposed and intended referents are in cases like Gates/Buffet/Slim and 
Ponting/Quine/Siddle. We also know, as I have argued, that Russellian English can no 
more be a theory of what words mean than Kripkean English can be a theory of what 
speakers mean or what people think words mean. However, if we force the interpreter to 
answer without explicitly telling him what we are asking about, all we will learn from his 
answer is how he interpreted our question, and not any deep truths about ‘semantics’. 
This is analogous to the way in which, according to Kripke (1977), anyone who assigns 
Donnellan’s (1966) truth-conditions to a misdescription-case is only revealing that he 
took us to be asking about speaker meaning. Such data reveals linguistic ambiguity, not 
philosophical depth. 
 
An analogy can serve to drive the point home. Let’s say I wish to determine how the 
word-form ‘meter’ is to be pronounced. Suppose that I have heard people pronouncing 
the word in radically different ways, and wish to discover which one was standard, i.e. I 
wish to discover how the vast majority of the population pronounces it. This sounds like a 
well-defined research-project. I can ask people to pronounce the word, record the results 
and determine which pronunciation is most common.  
 
Let us suppose, however, that I had the misfortune of only asking trilingual speakers who 
are fluent in Dutch, English and German. The problem, then, is that the word-form 
‘meter’, exists in English, Dutch and German, and means the same, but is pronounced 
differently. My results will be completely useless. If the English pronunciation ‘wins’ this 
will not reflect the fact that it is standard. Rather it will reflect the fact that the majority of 
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the test-subjects took me to be asking about English pronunciation. My results will not 
establish the ‘proper pronunciation’. Indeed, it could not do so, as there is no such thing 
as the ‘standard pronunciation of “meter”’, unless relativised to a language. 
 
The question ‘How do you pronounce this word?’ can be interpreted as ‘How do you 
pronounce this English word?’, ‘How do you pronounce this Dutch word?’ or ‘How do 
you pronounce this German word?’. These are three independent questions with 
independent answers. If ‘How do you pronounce this word?’, as used here, is supposed to 
mean anything distinct from this it is simply meaningless, but deceptive, babble. Herein 
lies the analogy (and I think it is an exact analogy to what has actually happened in 
semantics). The ready availability of answers to the question ‘What are the truth-
conditions of this utterance?’ only indicates that people take such a question to concern 
one of the notions discussed. But, just as there is no ‘real’ question as to the standard 
pronunciation of ‘meter’, so there is no question as to the ‘real’ truth-conditions. The 
question can, of course, be used to discover which one of the kinds of meaning someone 
took us to have meant by ‘meaning’ when we asked this question. But this trivial question 
is plainly not what has driven more than a century of semantic inquiry. 
 
6.3 Other definitions of ‘semantic’ that suffer from essentially the same defect 
 
In the objection above the objector tried to define the term ‘semantic referent’ with 
reference to the truth-conditions that competent speakers would attribute to utterances. 
The problem was that the ‘truth-conditions’ need to be truth conditions of something, i.e. 
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truth-conditions of the conventional meaning of the utterance, truth-conditions of the 
supposed linguistic meaning of the utterance,  truth-conditions of the intended meaning 
of the utterance, or truth-conditions of some related type of ‘meaning’. The question 
itself, as asked by the objector, does not succeed in determining a species of meaning for 
us to have disputes about. There are a myriad of ways in which an objector can formulate 
his definition of ‘semantic’ that would run afoul of the exact same requirement. I cannot 
go through all superficially different attempts that I have encountered that suffer exactly 
the same defect, but will merely mention three. 
 
The substantial difference between descriptivism and causalism is about how sentences 
manage to represent their intentional objects. Here we have the same problem again. The 
objector needs to specify whether he is talking about how sentences represent their 
conventionally assigned intentional objects, how sentences manage to communicate the 
intentional object that the speaker has in mind, how the sentence is related to the 
intentional object that the speaker believes the sentence to represent, or some related 
question. On the first three readings internalist descriptivism and externalist causalism 
cannot be rival theories of reference, and the formulation itself does not succeed in 
identifying a fourth option. 
 
The substantial difference between descriptivism and causalism is about the appropriate 
input for a compositional semantic theory that attempts to explain communication. 
Again, the question to be asked is “Semantic theory of what?” We can have a theory of 
the conventional meaning of a sentence, the supposed meaning of a sentence and the 
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intended meaning of a sentence, and all of these are essential to explaining 
communication. On each of these readings internalist descriptivism and externalist 
causalism cannot be rival theories, and the formulation itself does not identify any fourth 
type of ‘content’. 
 
The substantial difference between descriptivism and causalism is about what should or 
should not be values of names in a formal semantic theory. We can have a formal theory 
of the conventional meaning of sentences, a formal theory of the supposed (idiolectical) 
meaning of sentences, a formal theory of the primary (intended) meaning of sentences 
and a formal theory of other, related notions. Once again, this definition of ‘semantic’ is 
of no value until it has been specified what the formal theory in question is a formal 
theory about, whether it is one of the objects of my tripartite distinction or something 
else. On the first three readings, internalist descriptivism and externalist causalism cannot 
be plausible rival theories of reference and no fourth option has been identified. 
 
In all of the above cases the problem is that the objector’s definition of ‘semantic’ (or 
‘intentional object’, etc.) underdetermines what the topic of inquiry is supposed to be. 
Such objections suffer the same defect as the one discussed at length and are irrelevant. 
Also note that a need for a theory of the objects of my tripartite distinction, i.e. a theory 
of what words mean, what people mean and what people think words mean, arises 
naturally from any inquiry into communication and that what such inquiries are about 
could easily be explained to a ten-year old. This is in sharp contrast to the above, putative 
definitions of ‘semantic’. Their seeming sophistication only serves to conceal a lack of 
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conceptual depth, rigour and clarity. No doubt a hundred different semanticists can 
provide a hundred slightly different definitions of ‘semantic’, but I fail to see one that 
does not run into exactly the same difficulties. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
It has been claimed that internalist descriptivism is absurd as a theory of conventional 
reference. In stark contrast to this, it can be shown that the data that descriptivist theories 
try to account for matches the data that an inquiry into the linguistic beliefs of a speaker 
would generate (the Dictionary argument) and that the theoretical commitments of 
traditional descriptivism matches what Russell and Frege would claim about the 
linguistic beliefs of a speaker (the Transparency and Eccentricity argument). From this it 
follows that Russell and Frege’s views must stem from thinking about what we 
sometimes call the ‘idiolects’ of individual speakers. Such idiolects must 
(overwhelmingly) consist of a speaker's beliefs about the public conventions governing 
terms in a public language, and hence this is what their views must ultimately be ‘about’.  
 
Traditional descriptivism can no more be interpreted as a theory of the conventional 
referent than Kripke’s views can be interpreted as a theory of the intended or supposed 
referent. This means that we can only save the idea that they somehow clash if we find 
another worthwhile topic concerning names for them to disagree on. The way 
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philosophers typically define ‘semantic’ falls a long way short of identifying such a topic 
and I fail to see a candidate that would fare any better11. 
 
The idea that there is a basic issue that Kripke and Russell disagree on, while seemingly 
compelling, is based on an illusion. If the reader doubts this claim, do try and improve 
upon the hypothetical objector in coming up with a non-ambiguous question to which 
Kripkean externalism and traditional descriptivism can plausibly be regarded as rival 
answers. It is my contention that this cannot be done. The basic issue that Kripke and 
Russell are supposed to disagree on does not exist. 
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